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Introduction 
Learning is fundamental to human beings (Leitch et al., 1996) and to life itself 
(Thøgersen, 2010). It is thus no wonder that Fischer and Immordino-Yang (2007) 
assert that it is the specialisation that we use to become fully human. In the 
organisational context learning takes on a special significance and it is commonplace 
to speak in terms of organisational learning. Organisational learning means the 
process of improving actions through better knowledge and understanding (Burnes et 
al., 2003; Easterby-Smith, 1990), in other words it means changes in what the 
organisation knows and how it acts (Vakola, 2000). It is precisely against such a 
backdrop linking learning with change that organisational learning finds currency in the 
strategic management domain. More precisely organisational learning is the linchpin 
of dynamic capabilities. For instance Zollo and Winter (2002:340) define a dynamic 
capability as a “learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which the 
organisation systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of 
improved effectiveness.” To Teece (2007), ‘sensing’ requires learning about the 
environment and about new technological capabilities. For Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) speed is of the essence, thus dynamic capabilities involve the creation of new, 
situation-specific knowledge by engaging in experiential actions to learn quickly. 
Essentially, these authors variously recognise the value of an organisational learning 
capability to ensure the successful acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation of specific knowledge (Jones, 2004). The fact that dynamic capabilities 
are linked to sustainable firm performance illuminates the strategic importance of 
organisational learning. But just how do organisations learn? Learning is effectively a 
human phenomenon (Jarvis, 2006). In fact Grant (1996) shares a similar concern 
noting that knowledge creation is an individual activity. Indeed Grant’s view is 
sympathetic to Simon’s (1991) observation that all learning takes place inside 
individual human heads. Accordingly Simon suggests that an organisation learns in 
one of two ways: “(a) by learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new members 
who have knowledge the organisation didn't previously have” (1991: 125). With this 
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understanding Grant advances his knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm on the 
premise that the firm is an institution for knowledge application, thus the firm primary 
task is to integrate the specialised knowledge of multiple individuals. Therefore to 
Grant an organisational capability is an outcome of knowledge integration. Grant’s 
theory focuses on the individual as the basic unit of analysis in the study of 
organisational phenomena but more importantly it provides a framework to relate 
learning at the individual level to organisational capability. This is a particularly 
illuminating approach in the context of this paper as it provides for an organisational 
setting where professional learning can be critically analysed.  
 
Thus this paper is structured around the different conceptualisations of organisational 
capabilities and how these shape understanding of professional learning. In particular 
the emphasis is on managerial learning and the paper argues that current 
conceptualisations of organisational capabilities do not reflect the true dynamics of 
professional learning in organisations potentially leading to misleading conclusions. It 
is proposed that a morphogenetic approach to organisational capabilities provide a 
more nuanced understanding of the interaction between structure and agency in 
organisational life thereby exposing human reflexivity as deserving attention in the 
study of professional learning. 
 
Bounded Rationality – In Search of Ontological Security 
Conceptualising the dynamics of organising seems to have been incongruent and at 
times emotive oscillating between the poles of individualism and collectivism. 
Contemporary debate in the field is inspired by the evolutionary economics view of the 
firm advanced by Nelson and Winter (1982). Motivated by the work of Cyert, March, 
and Simon (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958), Nelson and Winter 
formulated a theory of industry and technological change (Dosi and Marengo, 2007). 
The evolutionary perspective is founded on the rejection of the cognitive assumptions 
underlying the rationality of the ‘economic man’. Instead the ‘real man’ has restricted 
computational and cognitive powers (Nelson and Winter, 2002), his capacity to acquire, 
store and process knowledge is limited (Grant, 1996). Impoverished by computational 
restraints social actors come to know about the world by acting within it, social practice 
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is central to knowing; about the self and others. Routines give actors automatic 
responses to stimuli providing individuals with ways of knowing and how to act, and a 
felt certainty that enables purposive choice (Mitzen, 2006). The notion of 
organisational capability in this tradition is premised on behavioural continuity or 
alternatively structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). A firm at any time 
operates largely to a set of decision rules (Nelson and Winter, 1974). These rules 
enshrine action possibilities, they are the dominant logic from past searches and serve 
to constrain and enable actions of current actors including managers. Given the 
bounded nature of managers’ cognition they are not assumed to have accurate 
foresight (Nelson and Winter, 2002). Through the combination of experiential path 
dependent learning and local search managers become sufficiently knowledgeable to 
instigate change in the decision rules; satisficing (Fagerberg, 2003; March, 1978) is 
the new name of the game. A manager’s ability in selecting new routines given an 
environmental stimulus is the essence of entrepreneurial function in the evolutionary 
sense (Teece, 2012). But this is entrepreneurship in a very limited sense given that 
foresight is not a commodity that managers can afford while search efforts remain local, 
reflection is therefore highly constrained. Theorising firm level events such as firm 
growth and firm profitability in terms of collective concepts like routines and indeed 
capabilities inevitably leaves the evolutionary theorists open to scrutiny. The evolution 
of markets based on the advocacy of universal Darwinism (Winter, 2011), selection 
and retention for instance which favours uniformity over variety sketched in the 
evolutionary story seems at odds with a Schumpeterian competitive dynamic which 
seems to emphasise discontinuity and diversity. This has led many to question the 
explanatory power of incremental change and routinized practices imbued in dynamic 
capabilities. According to Schreyögg and Kliesch‐Eberl (2007) frame-breaking 
changes are called for to overcome the strong inertial forces of capability. Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000) for their part suggest that in high-velocity environments dynamic 
capabilities should reflect simple, experiential, unstable processes that rely on quickly 
created new knowledge and iterative execution. As such from the vantage view of 
capabilities and routines the capability paradox appears to be located in the inertial 
effect of the path dependencies associated with the learning processes (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). But this understanding is also potentially myopic and incomplete 
without an account of the roles of the individuals. As Bandura puts it, “faced with 
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prescribed task demands, they act mindfully to make desired things happen rather 
than simply undergo happenings in which situational forces activate their sub-personal 
structures that generate solutions” (Bandura, 2001: 5). In fact the most persistent 
critiques of the evolutionary theory is directed at the deterministic view of human 
functioning implicit in habitual action, more specifically to the lack of consideration of 
individual-level components (Felin et al., 2012). Notwithstanding, the management 
literature as a whole has recently faced stern criticism from Hodgkinson and Healey 
(2011) who likened strategic management in particular to a series of rational and 
dispassionate activities. Setting their arguments against Teece’s (2007) micro-
foundations framework they argue that it alludes to an outdated conception of the 
strategist as a cognitive miser. Attributing the blame to Simon’s seminal notion of 
bounded rationality, Hodgkinson and his colleague note that the current understanding 
of dynamic capabilities privileges effortful form of reasoning and dispassionate 
analysis as the means of overcoming cognitive bias and strategic inertia. This has 
meant a heightened emphasis on the development of rational and analytical models 
and theories as aid to managerial learning that in most cases have served to impede 
rather than facilitate decision making and by extension strategic renewal. As such they 
have called for managerial learning tools that recognise the role of emotions as well 
as thoughts in the decision making process. Specifically they called for a “systematic 
program of work that conceives metacognition, emotion management, and self-
regulation as core dynamic managerial capabilities” (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011: 
1511). While it is surprising that in spite of the intervention from Hodgkinson and his 
friend little progress has been made on the part of the dynamic capabilities scholars 
to respond, elsewhere other scholars frequently speak in terms of reflexive managerial 
learning. In fact in making a case for reflexive learning Cunliffe argues that “we need 
to help managers to recognise the wider discursive structures in which they act, that 
they are acting beings within those structures, and can make sense of their actions in 
practical and responsive ways from inside experience” (Cunliffe, 2002: 40). Effectively 
Cunliffe is suggesting a rethinking of the notion of learning to take into account 
embodied rather than purely cognitive understanding. Her idea of a reflexive dialogical 
practice involves recognising our own place and ability to shape knowledge, learning 
and organisational realities. The notion of a reflexive dialogical practice do indeed 
appeal to questioning the taken for granted assumptions or tacit knowledge long 
associated with cognitive myopia. Speaking about reflexive practice is one thing, 
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achieving it another, in fact Cunliffe offers no guidance. However she assumes 
reflexivity to be metacognitive property uniformly accessed by all humans, Margaret 
Archer approaches reflexivity from a different perspective. 
 
An Internal Conversation Approach 
Archer discusses human reflexivity against the backdrop of the morphogenesis 
approach. The morphogenesis approach (see figure 1) is a methodological device 
premised on the interaction of three autonomous cycles of emergent powers; that of 
structure, culture and agency, in the context of this paper structure and culture can be 
argued to be indexed in an organisational capability. It signifies the understanding that 
people always act out of structural and cultural circumstances, which their very actions 
then proceed to modify or sustain (Porpora, 2013). Time is important in this framework, 
T1 represents the antecedent circumstances either structural or cultural or both 
(Porpora, 2013) termed structural conditioning. People act within their socio-cultural 
circumstances over time T2 - T3 in doing so gradually altering or sustaining those 
circumstances. The results at time T4 are the altered or sustained circumstances 
(elaboration or reproduction) that comprise the antecedent conditions for any further 
analysis of action. In the context of organisational capabilities this means that a 
capability (T1) shapes the action (T2-T3) of the actors who proceed to reproduce or 
change it (T4), thus a capability is reproduced in the action of individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Morphogenesis Approach – source Archer, 1995 
But agents are not generally social dopes; they do not simply frame actions against 
the structural and cultural dispositions of their environment (at T1) as the evolutionary 
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perspective of capabilities would have it. Through their emergent properties individuals 
actively reflect on the circumstances facing them. It follows therefore that there are 
two causal forces at work in shaping social actions, the objectivity of the social and the 
subjectivity of the individual. For Archer this subjectivity is the essence of our reflexivity, 
and indeed our humanity. Reflexivity in Archer’s term is the regular exercise of the 
mental ability, shared by all normal people, to consider themselves in relation to their 
(social) contexts and vice versa. Internal conversation is the conduit of reflexive 
thought with human embodied consciousness at its core, thus it carries emotional 
imprints. It emerges from the dialectical interplay between the natal social context and 
the interest of the human subject. For Archer internal conversation is a silent and 
private conversation with the self, “I says to myself says I” is a matter of privacy (Archer, 
2007). It is through this private self-conversation that the influences of the objective 
structural or cultural powers on social action are mediated. Individuals can therefore 
reflect on their own experience in this lone conversation and decide one course of 
action over another because they are not determined by their environment, neither are 
they slaves to their pasts. Compared to Cunliffe who stresses reflexivity as a 
homogeneous metacognitive practice in humans, Archer distinguishes between three 
dominant types of reflexive modes. Communicative reflexives are those individuals 
whose internal conversations require completion and confirmation by others before 
resulting in courses of action. In turn those individuals who sustain self-contained 
internal conversations leading directly to action are labelled as autonomous reflexives. 
The third mode of reflexivity identified by Archer is referred to as meta-reflexives. 
Those are the individuals who are critically reflexive about their own internal 
conversations and critical about effective action in society. Termed fractured reflexives 
those individuals’ internal conversations intensify their distress and disorientation 
rather than leading to purposeful courses of action. Of interest here are the distinctive 
ways each mode of reflexivity interacts with social structures. The communicative 
mode serves to mediate actions in the continuity of the work environment, and 
therefore tends to reproduce and reinforce existing socio-occupational structures (de 
Vaujany, 2008). While they do engage in internal conversation the communicative 
reflexives tend to endorse the status quo, they do not seek to engage with the taken 
for granted tacit assumptions or ideologies. This is because their thought and talk is 
completed externally, they do not trust in themselves to complete their internal 
conversation and tend to seek emotional comfort from others. On the other hand 
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Archer (2007a) remarks that the autonomous mode acts strategically towards the 
constrains and enablements of the social and tends to mediate actions that result in 
structural discontinuities (de Vaujany, 2008). These are the individuals who are 
knowledgeable about the social context they are placed in. They are independent 
learners and confident in their own self-talk so much so that they do not need 
confirmation from interlocutors. They are not afraid to challenge existing norms and 
often their action leads to organisational improvements. Where the communicatives 
are evasive and the autonomous are strategic, meta-reflexives are subversive (Hewitt, 
2004). This means that they will overcome constraints but forego enablements (Bovill, 
2012). As such meta-reflexives tend to repudiate the “market hegemony of exchange 
relations over human relations (Archer, 2007a: 265) often lending supporting to 
creating social movements outside mainstream employment structures (e.g., 
Greenpeace, Amnesty International etc.). Fractured reflexives for their part are unable 
to take a stance towards the society, they are passive subjects to whom things happen. 
These various mediatory tendencies reveal the autonomous reflexive mode as a 
potentially crucial resource for management learning. In fact the idea of autonomous 
reflexivity speaks to the notion of reflexive dialogical practice albeit in a more refined 
if not nuanced way. Although the idea of internal conversation is fairly new emerging 
empirical evidence has linked lone internal conversation psychological capital. 
Perhaps more intriguing is its association with creativity, innovativeness and 
entrepreneurship. For instance in a study of designers in the super yacht industry by 
Delbridge and Edwards (2013), the authors found the designers that displayed 
autonomous tendency to be more innovative and creative than the designers who 
displayed more communicative tendency. Furthermore the entrepreneurial spirit of the 
autonomous reflexives is exposed in the historical exploration of Sir Andrew Barclay 
Walker, the driving force behind the brewers Peter Walker & Son conducted by Mutch 
(2007). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
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Human reflexivity appears to have a key role in management learning not least owing 
to its propensity to questioning the status quo. However reflexivity seems to take on 
different shapes, reconciling Cunliffe’s reflexive dialogical practice with Archer’s 
internal conversation suggests autonomous reflexivity as a positive resource that 
individuals can draw on for self-development and self-regulation. Managers can draw 
on this metacognitive resource to help regulate their decision making process. 
However modes of reflexivity are enduring in the sense that they are acquired at a 
young age and seem to persist into adulthood. Nonetheless context has a hand to play 
in particular the experience of contextual discontinuity in the workplace seems to be 
propitious to autonomous reflexivity. In other literature such as the self-determination 
theory in which the autonomous orientation can be paralleled to autonomous reflexivity 
scholars speak in terms of autonomy supportive environment. In fact the notion of 
autonomous reflexivity is not to suggest an unrestricted entrepreneur portrayed by 
homo economicus, to the contrary individuals always act out of structured situations. 
But an autonomy supportive environment serves to enable rather than constrains 
autonomous reflexivity and it is from this congruency that the benefits are mutually 
reinforcing for both the individual and the organisation. Thus for organisational 
capabilities, maintaining the ontic differentiation between the capability itself and the 
individual allows for the conditions for action to be rendered analytically separable from 
action itself, so enabling their interplay, as opposed to their mutual interpenetration, to 
be explored (Herepath, 2014). The argument advanced here is that the experience of 
contextual discontinuity at work promotes autonomous learning facilitating 
organisational learning and in turn adaptive organisational behaviours. While the 
relationship between the autonomous mode of reflexivity and organisational outcomes 
in particular as regards to organisational change remains to be investigated it may be 
useful that organisations consider facilitating rather than impeding the development of 
autonomous reflexivity as the benefit might be substantial.  
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